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ABSTRACT 
 This paper examines the impact of increased competition in the credit rating 
industry on the rating quality of existing rating agencies. I compare the changes of 
S&P’s rating informativeness in response to entries of issuer-paid and investor-paid 
agencies by calculating the stock market reactions to S&P’s rating change 
announcements during different stages. My analyses show that the entry of Fitch, an 
issuer-paid agency, significantly weakened the stock market reactions, and the entry 
of EJR, an investor-paid agency, slightly slowed down but did not reverse the 
decreasing trend as well.
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INTRODUCTION 
Definition of Credit Ratings 
A credit rating assesses the creditworthiness of a borrower, including an 
individual, corporation, or sovereign government. It determines the possibility that the 
borrower will pay back the loan within the limited time without defaulting. A high 
credit rating represents the high likelihood of paying back the loan on time, which 
suggests that the borrower is creditworthy; a low credit rating indicates that the 
borrower had difficulty paying back entire loans in the past and might have the same 
trouble repaying its future borrowings.  
The credit ratings that I conducted my analyses on are corporate credit ratings. 
These corporate ratings are of great significance because investors can refer to them 
to make investment decisions. These ratings are typically issued by professional credit 
rating agencies. 
 
Credit Rating Agencies 
 Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are for-profit companies that provide object and 
independent analyses of corporations and sovereign governments by issuing credit 
ratings. CRAs make rating announcements periodically, and they will downgrade or 
upgrade when firms’ financial status changes. The ratings offered by CRAs are in the 
form of letter grades.  
 
History of the Credit Rating Industry 
 The credit rating industry originated in 1860s and rapidly developed in the 20th 
century. In 1970s, as the capital market expanded and complicated, and the data 
analysis tools advanced, the credit rating industry adopted several important changes.  
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One of the biggest changes was charging corporations fees for rating services 
because CRAs realized that their assessments towards corporations not only helped 
investors make investment choices but also facilitated access to capital for firms. 
 Another key change was the creation of the national recognized statistical 
ratings organizations (NRSRO) by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
which also benefits both investors and corporations. Investors can differentiate CRAs 
and rely on CRAs with the NRSRO status, while corporations can obtain capital more 
easily if they received favorable ratings from one or more NRSROs. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The credit rating industry provides important financial information for 
investors and plays an essential role in the financial markets of many countries. 
However, researchers all over the world have questioned the credibility of the credit 
rating agencies (CRAs) and have proposed solutions to improve the credit rating 
industry. 
My research focuses on the credit rating industry in the United States because 
the three major CRAs (Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch) are headquartered in 
the U.S. and the U.S. financial market have been influential shaping the entire credit 
rating industry (White, 2013). 
In sections below, I discuss (1) the CRAs’ reputational concerns after the 
crises, (2) the issuer-paid model and conflicts of interest, (3) the potential solutions to 
rating bias, and (4) my research focus. 
 
Reputational Concerns 
The credit rating industry has been of recent public interest, particularly in 
terms of the role CRAs played in the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the following 
Eurozone crisis. Major CRAs have been accused of largely contributing to the 
financial turmoil by deliberately issuing inflated and uninformative ratings because a 
considerable amount of top-rated firms and financial products collapsed during the 
crises (Mathis, McAndrew, & Rochet, 2009; Jeon & Lovo, 2013). These accusations 
have generated substantial reputational concerns towards major CRAs and have raised 
public interest in exploring the origins of the dilemma faced by the current credit 
rating industry and the potential solutions to solve the problem (Skreta & Veldkamp, 
2009; Sangiorgi & Spatt, 2017). 
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The Issuer-Paid Model and Conflicts of Interest 
The issuer-paid rating model, where firms compensate CRAs for providing 
ratings, is the mainstream revenue model in the current credit rating industry. 
However, the conflicts of interest caused by the issuer-paid model lead to loosened 
rating standards, inflated rating results, and reduced rating informativeness (Bolton, 
Freixas, & Shapiro, 2012; Strobl & Xia, 2012). The sources of the conflicts of interest 
include but are not limited to: 
a)   CRAs’ tendency to issue favorable ratings to attract business (Bolton et al., 
2012); 
b)   Rating analysts’ motivation to award inflated ratings to future employers 
(Cornaggia, J., Cornaggia, & Xia, 2015); 
c)   Firms’ ability to shop for the best rating, often referred as rating shopping 
(Bolton et al., 2012); 
d)   CRAs’ incentives to make rating adjustments to cater to issuers’ interest, 
often referred as rating catering (Griffin & Tang, 2012; Griffin, 
Nickewsmrson, & Tang, 2013); 
e)   Investors’ trusting nature and unawareness of rating distortion (Bolton et 
al., 2012; Strobl & Xia, 2012). 
The Big Three credit rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch Ratings, and 
Moody’s, who collectively hold a global market share of roughly 95 percent (Jeon & 
Lovo, 2013), all use the issuer-paid model and have received criticisms of their 
unreliability during the financial crises.  
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Potential Solutions to Rating Bias 
After identifying problems in the credit rating industry, prior studies have 
proposed several potential solutions including supporting more unsolicited ratings, 
switching to investor-paid model, and increasing competition. However, none of them 
have reached consensus and their effectiveness is still under examination. Below is a 
discussion of some potential solutions listed above: 
Support more unsolicited ratings. 
Contrary to solicited ratings, which are requested and purchased by firms, 
unsolicited ratings are released by CRAs without the request and for free. Since firms 
are able to selectively pay for and disclose the best ratings they receive, unsolicited 
ratings are commonly considered less inflated and have received more support from 
the SEC in recent years (Sangiorgi & Spatt, 2012; Sangiorgi & Spatt, 2017). 
Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (2014) have examined and verified that in equilibrium, 
unsolicited ratings are lower than solicited ratings for the same instruments. They also 
show evidence that unsolicited ratings in the credit rating system can potentially 
improve rating standards because they reduce the conflicts of interest caused by rating 
shopping and selective disclosure.  
However, the objectivity of unsolicited ratings is questionable. Fulghieri et al. 
(2014) have pointed out that unsolicited ratings can still lead to rating bias because 
ultimately CRAs want to gain revenue. As a result, CRAs have incentives to publish 
unfavorable unsolicited ratings to punish and threaten those issuers who refuse to 
request and pay for their rating services.  
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Switch to investor-paid model. 
In opposition to the issuer-paid rating model, CRAs that adopt the investor-
paid model receive compensation from investors. Although only a small portion of the 
CRAs employ the investor-paid model today, this compensation structure was the 
original business structure when the credit rating industry germinated. As the 
investor-paid model does not require business relationships between CRAs and 
issuers, many researchers believe that credit ratings released by investor-paid agencies 
are more accurate and informative than those released by major issuer-paid agencies 
(Bruno, Cornaggia, J., & Cornaggia, 2011; Strobl & Xia, 2012; Jiang, Stanford, & 
Xie, 2012; Xia, 2014).  
Switching to the investor-paid model can possibly improve the rating quality, 
but several existing literatures have noticed that the popularization of investor-paid 
services can largely decrease the amount of available public information in the market 
(Skreta & Veldkamp, 2009; White, 2013; Sangiorgi & Spatt, 2017). The collapse of 
market for information will further reduce the market transparency and efficiency, 
which may also hinder the growth of the entire credit rating industry. 
Increase competition. 
 In addition to the two previously mentioned potential solutions, Doherty, 
Kartasheva, and Phillips (2012) claim in their research that increased competition can 
help improve the information content of credit ratings: a new agency will employ 
higher rating standards to target higher-than-average firms and gain market share. 
However, according to many other researchers, the impact of increased 
competition changes as the revenue model of the new entrant change. When the new 
entrant is an issuer-paid agency, the increased competition can worsen the problem, 
even lowering the rating quality of the incumbents (Skreta & Veldkamp, 2009; 
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Becker & Milbourn, 2011). When the new entrant is an investor-paid agency, Xia 
(2014) provides evidence that the issuer-paid incumbents become more responsive to 
credit risks and issue more informative ratings.  
Randomly assign firms to CRAs.  
 After the 2008-2009 financial crisis when ratings issued by major CRAs were 
proved to be inflated and inaccurate, the public urgently called for tight regulations on 
CRAs. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank) is a United States federal law that was enacted on July 20, 2010 to ameliorate 
the unsatisfactory credit rating industry. One of the amendments passed into Dodd-
Frank proposed by senators Al Franken and Roger Wicker was that the SEC should 
randomly assign firms or securities to those CRAs with the NRSRO status to 
minimize the conflicts of interest and give more business to CRAs that provide more 
accurate ratings on annual basis (Jollineau, Tanlu, & Winn, 2014). However, the 
Franken-Wicker amendment was cut in the final version of Dodd-Frank, and instead, 
Dodd-Frank only required the SEC to conduct a study about the conflicts of interest 
problem in the credit rating industry. The study released two-and-a-half years after the 
enactment of Dodd-Frank suggested that it is not necessary to implement the Franken-
Wicker amendment to solve the dilemma.  
 
My Research Focus 
My research focuses on the third of the proposed solutions: increasing 
competition. Many existing research projects have studied the influence of increased 
competition in the credit rating industry, which is caused by entries of agencies with 
either an issuer-paid model or an investor-paid model (Becker & Milbourn, 2011; 
Xia, 2014). However, few projects have compared the impacts of the two types of 
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competition and have subsequently differentiated the net effect of each type when 
agents with different revenue models enter the industry consecutively. To fill that gap, 
I compare the changes in S&P’s ratings in response to entries of investor-paid and 
issuer-paid agencies after eliminating their cross effects. My research result can better 
examine the “increasing competition” solution and provide future researchers with 
more evidence to evaluate the solution. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Sample Selection 
In order to compare changes in Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit ratings in 
response to entries of agencies of different revenue models, I choose Fitch Ratings 
(Fitch) and Egan-Jones Ratings (EJR) to respectively represent the issuer-paid and 
investor-paid agencies and analyze the impact of their entries on the quality of ratings 
issued by S&P. Fitch and EJR are both major credit rating agencies recognized by the 
SEC as the NRSRO and several studies, including Xia (2012) and Becker and 
Milbourn (2011), show that the entries of Fitch and EJR have significantly influenced 
the information quality of S&P’s ratings.  
Fitch, one of the Big Three CRAs in the rating industry, was founded in 1914 
in New York City as the Fitch Publishing Company. In 1975, the SEC recognized 
Fitch as one of the NRSRO, but not until 1990s did Fitch rapidly expanded its rating 
services. Although Fitch is the smallest of the Big Three in market share, it still plays 
a critical role in the credit rating industry and contributes to the financial market. 
EJR was founded in 1995 as a wholly investor-supported rating agency, and 
was granted the NRSRO status in 2007. Since the inception, EJR has issued numbers 
of corporate ratings for firms from various sectors. As of 2011, EJR has covered 
approximately 60% of the market, and up to 80% in terms of the total assets (Xia, 
2014). Prior research also finds that EJR provides more informative credit ratings and 
its ratings lead to greater market reactions (Beaver, Shakespeare, & Soliman, 2006).  
As a result, Fitch and EJR can well represent the two types of CRAs and 
reflect the major reputational issues in the credit rating industry. 
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Data Collection 
I constructed my sample by merging three rating databases from S&P, Fitch, 
and EJR from 1990 to 2011 and conducting my analyses on those firms rated by all 
three agencies. I limited my data to this time period because both Fitch and EJR 
expanded rapidly in 1990s and have become critical competitors to S&P since then. 
Because EJR does not provide ratings to issuers’ individual bond issues, my analysis 
only focuses on comparison in corporate ratings. I obtained S&P’s corporate credit 
ratings from RatingsXpress data services, which contains detailed ratings from 1920s, 
and I collected EJR’s ratings directly from its original database. I used Fitch ratings 
for bond issues of each firm from the Mergent FISD database to proxy for corporate 
ratings by choosing the highest bond rating among a firm’s all bond issues at a given 
time. To differentiate the influence made by Fitch and EJR, I divided my sample into 
two categories:  
•   Dataset 1: companies Fitch initiated ratings before EJR did 
•   Dataset 2: companies EJR initiated ratings before Fitch did 
Among all triple-rated firms, 90% of the firms belong to Dataset 1; among firms in 
Dataset 2, majority of them received Fitch’s first ratings right after EJR initiated 
ratings. As a result, there is little data available to study the period when only S&P 
and EJR were major players in the industry, so I mainly focused my research on 
Dataset 1 in this paper and differentiated the net impacts created by agencies of 
different models in Dataset 1. I further selected firms that S&P initiated ratings before 
Fitch did and defined 3 stages: 
•   Stage 1: only S&P rated the firm 
•   Stage 2: both S&P and Fitch rated the firm 
•   Stage 3: S&P, Fitch, and EJR rated the firm 
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To better conduct the analyses, I limited my sample to firms that have all 3 
stages with each one lasting for at least 12 quarters. 203 firms meet the requirement 
and compose my data sample. These 203 firms have average total asset of 6.06 
billion. Due to the complexity of the dataset, I randomly selected 50 firms from the 
sample, and proceeded my analyses using the selected firms. The 50 firms have 
average total asset of 6.5 billion and can be considered as a good representation of my 
data sample. 
By comparing rating change announcements during different stages, I studied 
the net impacts of different entries. I looked into the comparison between Stage 2 and 
Stage 1 to study Fitch’s net impact and into the comparison between Stage 3 and 
Stage 2 to study EJR’s net impact (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of Comparison Between Different Stages 
 
Numerical Representation of Rating Grade 
To better conduct quantitative analyses, I assigned a numerical value to each 
rating on a notch basis as follows: AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, AA-=4, A+=5, A=6, A-
=7, BBB+=8, BBB=9, BBB-=10, BB+=11, BB=12, BB-=13, B+=14, B=15, B-=16, 
CCC+=17, CCC=18, CCC-=19, CC=20, C=21, and D=22. By subtracting the number 
assigned to the previous rating from the number assigned to the following rating, the 
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rating change can also be expressed numerically. For example, a downgrade from 
BB- to B is +2, while an upgrade from AA- to AA is -1. 
 
Research Design  
Following Xia’s (2014) method, I used the informativeness of rating changes 
to examine the effect of Fitch’s and EJR’s entries on S&P’s rating quality. Prior 
literature demonstrated that the informativeness of rating change announcements can 
effectively reflect the value of S&P’s ratings.  
Informativeness of rating changes. 
I examined the informativeness of rating changes (upgrades and downgrades) 
by analyzing the stock market reactions to S&P’s rating change announcements. 
Existing literature (e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Hull, Predescu, and White 
(2004), and Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005)) have widely used this method to evaluate the 
quality of information content provided in rating changes. To quantify the magnitude 
of market reactions to S&P’s rating changes, I calculated the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) over the three-day event window including one day before the event, 
the event day (when S&P announces rating change), and one day following the event. 
The higher the absolute value of the CAR, the greater the market reaction is to the 
specific rating change announcement. Furthermore, a greater market reaction 
indicates that S&P’s rating changes contain more information that the market lacks, 
and thus, shows the ratings’ better informativeness.  
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Formulas 
Following previous research projects, I calculated the expected return of a 
firm stock using the CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model): 𝐸𝑅# = 𝑅% + 𝛽#(𝐸𝑅) − 𝑅%) 
Where: 𝐸𝑅# = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅% = 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒	  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝛽# = 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑅) = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑	  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 
 
The risk-free rate in the model indicates the rate of return of the investment 
with no risk of loss. I used the daily one-year treasury yield curve rates from the 
resource center of the U.S. Department of the Treasury as the risk-free rates in my 
analyses, since the one-year treasury yield, or the Treasury bill, is considered nearly 
free of default risk because the U.S. government issues it.  
The beta of the investment is a measure of the volatility of the investment in 
comparison to the unsystematic risk of the market. The beta I used in my calculations 
is the monthly price change of a particular firm relative to the monthly price change 
of the S&P 500 over 3 years. 
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I approximated the expected return of market by calculating the actual market 
return and selected S&P 500 to represent the performance of the market using the 
following formula: 
𝐴𝑅) = 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 − 1 
Where: 𝐴𝑅) = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙	  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 = 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 = 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑑𝑎𝑦 
  
I measured the actual return of a firm stock by a similar formula: 
𝐴𝑅# = 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 − 1 
Where: 𝐴𝑅# = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙	  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 = 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑣 = 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑	  𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 = 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔	  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑑𝑎𝑦 
  
 
I then calculated the abnormal return by: 𝐴𝐵𝑅# = 𝐴𝑅# − 𝐸𝑅# 
Where: 𝐴𝐵𝑅# = 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙	  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
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The cumulative abnormal return over the three-day event window is: 𝐶𝐴𝑅# = 𝐴𝐵𝑅#,JK + 𝐴𝐵𝑅#,L + 𝐴𝐵𝑅#,K 
Where: 𝐶𝐴𝑅# = 𝐶𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	  𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙	  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝐵𝑅#,JK = 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙	  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛	  𝑜𝑛	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑑𝑎𝑦	  𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝐵𝑅#,L = 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙	  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛	  𝑜𝑛	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑑𝑎𝑦	  𝑜𝑓	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝐵𝑅#,K = 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙	  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛	  𝑜𝑛	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑑𝑎𝑦	  𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟	  𝑡ℎ𝑒	  𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 
Absolute CAR Per Grade Change 
Although most rating changes only change by one grade, there are cases that 
CRAs announce rating changes across the grades. Typically, greater rating changes 
lead to greater market reactions. To fairly compare rating change announcements 
during different stages, I divided the absolute value of the CAR of each rating change 
by the number that represents the rating change to get the market reaction caused by 
changing the rate by one grade. 
After finishing all CAR calculations, I categorized my data sample by stages 
defined in previous sections and measured the average CAR at each stage. 
 
Hypotheses 
 Before eliminating the cross effect, conclusions drawn in previous studies 
suggest that the increased competition caused by entries of issuer-paid agencies has a 
negative impact on S&P’s rating quality while that caused by entries of investor-paid 
agencies improves S&P’s rating quality. Based on these conclusions, I made the 
following hypotheses: (1) S&P’s rating change announcement generated lower CARs 
after Fitch’s entry but (2) generated higher CARs after EJR’s entry. 
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Limitations 
 There are several worth-noticing factors that I didn’t consider in my research 
project including CRA’s selection bias, investors’ trusting nature, and the nonlinearity 
of rating changes. 
CRA’s selection bias. 
 CRAs have the right to choose which firms to rate and when to rate, so the list 
of triple-rated firms is a result of the three CRAs’ selection. Therefore, it is possible 
that there existed a selection bias when CRAs decided to initiate ratings for specific 
firms. For example, studies show that EJR prefers to provide ratings for firms with 
higher asset value (Xia, 2014). As a result, the list of triple-rated firms might not be a 
perfect representations of the market.  
Investors’ trusting nature. 
 As I stated in the literature review section, investors are typically unaware of 
rating distortions. They tend to trust the information provided by CRAs and make 
their investment choices based on that. However, by using CAR as a measure of 
rating informativeness and rating quality, I assumed that investors were able to react 
quickly to rating changes and assess the changes in rating quality sensitively. 
Nonlinearity of rating changes. 
 In reality, the relationship between the stock market reactions generated by 
rating change announcements and the rating grade changes are not linear. For 
instance, a downgrade from AAA to AA+ and a downgrade from BBB to BB+ have 
different impacts on the market, even though both downgrades are of the same size. 
As I simply divided the absolute total CAR by grade changes when calculating 
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absolute CAR per grade change, I ignored the nonlinearity and presumed a linear 
model, which might create some inaccuracies in the results. 
Furthermore, although Fitch and EJR are the major players in the industry, 
whose entries largely contribute to changes in S&P’s rating strategy, other factors 
including but not limited to economy recessions and policy changes might have also 
imposed pressure on S&P to make adjustments in its rating methodology. Future 
researchers can include these factors and conduct more well-rounded analysis. 
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ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
In sections below, I discuss my findings in each of the stages, compare the 
difference among different stages, explore potential causes of the overall trend, re-
examine my analyses after removing the order factor, and study the implications of 
downgrades and upgrades. 
  
Stage 1 
 Stage 1 is the stage when firms only received ratings from S&P, and the 
period of stage 1 is different for each firm. In my data sample, stage 1 ranges from 
1990 to 2001, but most firms have their stage 1 last from 1991 to 1996 (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: Stage 1 Absolute CAR per Grade Change 
 
The highest absolute CAR per grade change during stage 1 among 50 firms is 
53.14%, when S&P upgraded the Advanced Micro Devices Inc. on May 12th, 1995 
from BB- to BB. The minimum absolute CAR per grade change is 0.07%, when 
Apple Computer Inc. received downgrades from A- to BBB on August 15th, 1994.  
 24 
The average absolute CAR per grade change in my dataset during stage 1 is 
11.35%. According to Figure 3, the first quartile is 2.57% and the third quartile is 
15.93%. 
 
 
Figure 3: Stage 1 Boxplot 
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Stage 2 
 At Stage 2, both Fitch and S&P rated the firms that I selected. As I mentioned 
in previous sections, stage 2 is at least 12 quarters but its exact length depends on 
firms. The 69 rating announcements during stage 2 are from 1992 to 2008, while 50 
of them fall between 1995 and 2000 (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4: Stage 2 Absolute CAR per Grade Change 
 
40.71% is the maximum absolute CAR per grade change during stage 2, while 
0.13% is the lowest among all announcements. The absolute CAR reaches the peak 
when S&P upgraded the AK Steel Holding Corporation on July 31st, 1995 from B+ to 
BB-. The minimum absolute CAR per grade change happened when NVR Inc. 
received upgrades from BB to BB+ on April 14th, 2003.  
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The average absolute CAR per grade change in my dataset during stage 2 is 
8.94%. According to Figure 5, the first quartile is 2.31% and the third quartile is 
12.70%. 
 
 
Figure 5: Stage 2 Boxplot 
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Stage 3 
 Stage 3 represents the period that all three CRAs, S&P, Fitch, and EJR, rated 
the firms. Since my dataset contains ratings till the end of 2011, there are 126 rating 
announcements during stage 3. All the announcements happened after 1996, and most 
rating changes were announced after 2000 (Figure 6). 
  
 
Figure 6: Stage 3 Absolute CAR per Grade Change 
 
S&P’s rating change announcement that upgraded the AK Steel Holding 
Corporation from BB- to BB on September 30th, 1999 generated an absolute CAR of 
43.65%, the highest value during stage 3 in my data sample. The lowest absolute 
CAR is 0.00% as Advanced Micro Devices Inc. received upgrade from CCC+ to B- 
on November 13th, 2009. 
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The average absolute CAR per grade change of all rating change 
announcements during stage 3 is 6.73%. According to Figure 7, the first quartile is 
1.9% and the third quartile is 8.21%. 
 
 
Figure 7: Stage 3 Boxplot 
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Since on average stage 3 is the longest among all stages, I also conducted the 
same analyses using ratings announcements made before 2006 and 2004. When only 
ratings before 2006 were considered, the average absolute CAR per grade change 
increases to 7.47%, and the first quartile and the third quartile change to 1.84% and 
10.21% respectively (Figure 8). When I further brought forward the cut-off line and 
only took into account rating announcements before 2004, the average absolute CAR 
per grade change increases again to 8.75%, with the first quartile being 2.59% and the 
third quartile being 11.66% (Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 8: Stage 3 Boxplot Using Ratings Before 2004 
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Figure 9: Stage 3 Boxplot Using Ratings Before 2006 
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In addition to directly move forward the cut-off line, I shortened the original 
stage 3 to 12 quarters for all firms and repeated my previous calculations. The 
shortened stage 3 then contains 77 rating announcements. The average absolute CAR 
per grade change during the shortened stage 3 also increases from 6.73% to 7.56%. 
According to Figure 10, the first quartile advances to 1.92% and the third quartile 
goes up to 9.49%. 
 
 
Figure 10: Stage 3 Boxplot Using Ratings Within 12 Quarters 
 
 Overall, analyses above show a decreasing trend in the average absolute CAR 
per grade change as the stage 3 extends.  
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Comparison Between Stage 1 and 2 
 As stated in prior sections, only S&P provided ratings for firms in my sample 
during stage 1, and Fitch joined during stage 2 to offer additional assessments of 
corporations. To study the net impact of the entry of Fitch on S&P’s rating quality, I 
drew comparable analyses between for stage 1 and 2 from the following perspectives: 
the average, range, and quartiles of the absolute CAR per grade change. 
 Stage 1’s 11.35% average absolute CAR per grade change outperforms stage 
2’s 8.94% by 2.41%, which suggests that the stock market has smaller reactions on 
average to S&P’s rating announcements after Fitch initiated ratings to firms in my 
sample.  
 Stage 2 also has a smaller range of 40.58% in absolute CAR per grade change 
than stage 1’s 53.07%. Stage 1’s larger range indicates that stage 1 has outliers that 
are more extreme than those of stage 2, and the outliers may have significantly 
increased the average absolute CAR per grade change during stage 1.  
 However, the quartiles, which measure the spread of values above and below 
the mean, represent the group of values as a whole. In my sample, both the first and 
the third quartiles of stage 1 are greater than those of stage 2, which demonstrates that 
rating change announcements made during stage 1 led to greater market reactions 
overall. 
 I concluded from findings above that S&P’s rating change announcements 
generated smaller stock market reactions during stage 2 when Fitch, another issuer-
paid CRA, entered the credit rating industry. This result is consistent with my first 
hypothesis in the methodology section, and verifies claims of Becker and Milbourn 
(2011) that competition increased by entries of issuer-paid CRAs lowers the rating 
informativeness of existing industry players.  
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Comparison Between Stage 2 and 3 
 EJR entered the credit rating industry during stage 3, joining S&P and Fitch to 
provide credit ratings for corporations. I compare the stock market reactions to S&P’s 
rating announcements during stage 2 to the reactions during stage 3 to discuss the net 
impact of EJR’s entry on S&P’s rating informativeness. Similarly, I analyzed the 
differences by the average, range, and the quartiles of the absolute CAR per grade 
change. 
 The absolute CAR per grade change averages 6.73% during stage 3, which is 
2.21% lower than the average of stage 2. The reduced average absolute CAR per 
grade change represents smaller stock market reactions on average towards S&P 
rating announcements after EJR started to provide ratings for firms in my dataset. 
 Stage 3’s 43.65% range in absolute CAR per grade change is wider than stage 
2’s 40.58%, but stage 3’s outliers concentrate on the right tail and have already pulled 
up the average. Therefore, if I eliminate outliers, there will be an even larger decrease 
on average from stage 2 to stage 3.  
 The quartiles also provide evidence that rating change announced during stage 
3 did not generate stronger stock market reactions. In my sample, both the first and 
the third quartiles of stage 3 are smaller than those of stage 2, which signifies that, in 
general, EJR’s entry did not reverse the decreasing stock market reactions. 
 All comparisons above show that the stock market reacted weakly after EJR’s 
entry, although EJR chooses an investor-paid revenue model. There is an overall 
decreasing trend in stock market reactions towards S&P’s rating change 
announcements. The analyses do not support my second hypothesis in the 
methodology section that entries of investor-paid CRAs can improve existing players’ 
rating quality and create stronger stock market reactions. 
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Since stage 3 is longer than stage 2 for most firms, I also compared stage 2 to 
the three shortened versions of stage 3: using rating announcements before 2004, 
before 2006, and within 12 quarters. All the versions have average absolute CAR per 
grade change smaller than that of stage 2, but the one using rating announcements 
before 2004 has an average of 8.75%, which is fairly close to stage 2’s 8.94%. This 
result shows that although EJR’s entry did not elevate the stock market reactions, it 
slowed down the overall decreasing trend in the short term (Figure 11). 
 Here is one possible interpretation of my finding about stage 3: when EJR just 
initiated ratings, other existing CRAs might have paid decent attention to its 
performance; while in the long run, EJR did not have enough influence on the 
industry to sway the rating quality of major industry players. This interpretation 
suggests that since the issuer-paid revenue model is still the mainstream in the 
industry, the investor-paid agencies are not able to bring about a radical change in the 
current state of the conflicts of interest problem. 
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Figure 11: All Stages Boxplot 
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Potential Causes of the Decreasing Trend 
 Based on prior research projects and my analyses, the overall decreasing trend 
of the absolute CAR per grade change over the three stages might be ascribed to the 
following reasons: CRAs’ reputational concerns, changes of firm characteristics, and 
order of announcements. 
CRAs’ reputational concerns.  
CRAs’ continuous reputational concerns have been one of the major reasons 
that leads to the decreasing trend in stock market reactions. As the credit rating 
industry rapidly expanded and complicated in 1990s, CRAs became more profitable 
and influential, and some of them took improper actions to win more business. These 
actions raised investors’ awareness and made CRAs’ objectivity questionable. 
Investors doubted the accuracy of the information provided by CRAs and hesitated to 
react strongly to those rating change announcements.  
 CRAs’ performances were even worse in 2000s during the US subprime 
mortgage crisis and the following financial crisis, which substantially disappointed 
investors. Investors had stronger reservations towards rating quality and were more 
conservative when ratings changed. Therefore, even EJR entered the market and 
reduced the conflicts of interest, the stock market reactions still weakened. 
 
 
 
 
 
 37 
Changes of firm characteristics. 
 Since my analyses spanned from 1990 to 2011, firms in my data sample might 
have substantial changes in their characteristics. Kogan and Papanikolaou (2013) 
indicate that firm characteristics including valuation ratios, past investment, and 
profitability are highly correlated with stock returns. As a result, part of the 
decreasing trend might be attributed to the changes of firm characteristics over the 
three stages. 
Order of announcements.  
During stage 2 and 3, there were more than one agency in the credit rating 
industry, and agencies can choose to issue ratings on the same day or publish them 
separately. If they announced rating changes sequentially, the information on the 
market was different when the first agency changed ratings from the information the 
market knew when the second agency published rating changes. The public might 
have already known the changes in the firm’s performance when the second agency 
announced rating changes, so they didn’t react to the second announcement as much 
as they did to the first one. Therefore, it’s possible that when S&P was not the first 
mover in the industry, the stock market reactions to its rating change announcements 
were not as large as the reactions during stage 1 – when S&P was the only player 
among the three. 
 
Differentiate the Order of Announcements 
To eliminate the effect of the order of announcements during stage 2 and 3, I 
divided my sample by identifying the CRA that announced rating changes first during 
each stage and conducted separate analyses. Since EJR is an investor-paid agency and 
their rating announcements are not accessible for the general public, I only 
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differentiated between rating announcements from S&P and Fitch. As I focused on 
the market reactions to S&P’s rating announcements, I split my sample into two 
groups: (1) S&P made rating changes before or on the same day Fitch did, and (2) 
S&P made rating changes after Fitch did. When S&P announced rating changes in 
group 1, there was no existing information about the changes on the market. When 
S&P announced rating changes that belong to group 2, the market was already 
informed by Fitch about the change. 
Stage 2. 
 During stage 2, S&P announced 15% of its rating changes after Fitch did. By 
eliminating these rating announcements from the calculation, the average absolute 
CAR per grade change boosts from 8.94% to 9.18%. Although there is an increase, 
the average absolute CAR per grade change during stage 2 is still smaller than stage 
1’s 11.35%. Therefore, the conclusion that I drew for Fitch’s entry still holds after 
removing the effect of order of announcements. 
Stage 3. 
 During stage 3, 91% of all rating announcements made by S&P came no later 
than Fitch’s announcements. When only taking these announcements into 
consideration, the average absolute CAR per grade change also increased from 6.73% 
to 6.83%. Similarly, the slight increase is not able to stop the decreasing trend of the 
average absolute CAR per grade change since 6.83% is smaller than stage 2’s 8.94%. 
As a result, EJR’s entry did not elevate the stock market reactions even if I excluded 
the effect of existing information on the market. 
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Downgrades and Upgrades 
Previous research projects demonstrated that the stock market reacts 
differently to rating downgrades and upgrades: rating downgrades can typically 
generate greater absolute CARs (Xia, 2014). My analyses also verified this statement. 
With 114 downgrades and 119 upgrades in my data sample, the average absolute 
CAR per grade change was 8.67% for downgrades and 7.55% for upgrades. 
Empirical evidence also suggested that CRAs’ failures to provide sufficient 
negative information bring them higher reputational costs (Kisgen, 2007). As a result, 
if entries of Fitch and EJR elevated S&P’s reputational concerns, there should be an 
asymmetrical change between downgrades and upgrades.  
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According to Figure 12, upgrades had a much larger drop from stage 2 to stage 
3 than downgrades did. A possible interpretation could be that EJR’s entry during 
stage 3 raised S&P’s awareness of its reputational concerns so that the overall 
decreasing trend slowed down for downgrades during stage 3. 
 
 
Figure 12: Comparison of Average Absolute CAR per Grade Change Between 
Downgrades and Upgrades 
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CONCLUSION 
 In this paper I studied the changes in S&P’s rating quality in response to 
entries of issuer-paid and investor-paid credit rating agencies. I selected two well-
known CRAs with the NRSRO status Fitch and EJR to respectively represent 
agencies that employ the issuer-paid model and agencies that employ the investor-
paid model. I conducted all my analyses on firms rated by all three CRAs. Subject to 
the data I have, I focused my research on companies that Fitch initiated ratings before 
EJR did and further applied several criteria to finalize my data sample. 
Following prior research projects, I considered the informativeness of rating 
changes as an effective measure of rating quality, and I used stock market reactions to 
rating announcements to evaluate the informativeness of rating changes. To quantify 
the public’s reactions, I calculated CARs over the three-day event window for each 
S&P’s rating change. By comparing the absolute CAR per grade change during 3 
stages: (1) only S&P provided ratings; (2) S&P and Fitch provided ratings; and (3) 
S&P, Fitch, and EJR provided ratings, I found an evident decrease in S&P’s rating 
informativeness after Fitch’s entry, and EJR’s entry slightly alleviated but did not stop 
the decreasing trend.  
 Possible causes of the overall decreasing trend include CRAs’ severe 
reputational concerns, the changes of firm characteristics over stages, and the order of 
S&P’s and Fitch’s rating change announcements. I proceeded my analyses by 
differentiating the order of announcements, calculating the stock market reactions to 
S&P’s rating announcements when there was no information about the rating changes 
on the market. Similar results revealed in the analyses on both Fitch’s and EJR’s 
entries: S&P’s rating quality dropped after new agencies entered the credit rating 
industry.  
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 My findings fill the gap in existing literature by drawing comparisons between 
different types of entries in the industry and further examine the idea of “increase 
competition” as a solution to recover the credibility of CRAs. Additional issuer-paid 
raters can certainly worsen the problem, while additional investor-paid agencies may 
slightly help improve the rating quality in the short term but can not reverse the 
existing status in the long run.  
 My research also has implications for regulations in the credit rating industry. 
Since “increase competition” can not be considered as a reliable solution in the long 
run according to my analyses, the current dilemma in the industry can not be solved 
by the market itself. Therefore, the complete remedy of the unsatisfactory situation 
requires more involvements from legislative institutions.    
 
Future Research Directions 
To continue and perfect the analyses on potential solutions to the conflicts of 
interest problem in the credit rating industry, future researchers can design their 
projects from the following perspectives: measure the responsiveness of S&P’s 
ratings to credit risk, analyze firms that EJR initiated ratings before Fitch did, and 
examine more recent data to assess the latest developments in the industry. 
Measure the responsiveness of S&P’s ratings to credit risk. 
As my measurements of stock market reactions did not consider the impact of 
investors’ trusting nature, future researchers can use other measures to get rid of this 
limitation. According to Xia, ratings’ responsiveness to credit risk is also an 
informative measure of rating quality. To test the responsiveness of S&P’s ratings to 
credit risk, researchers can examine the correlation between S&P’s ratings and the 
expected default probability (EDP): a higher correlation indicates that S&P’s ratings 
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are more responsive to credit risk. As researchers compare the correlations over 
different stages, if S&P’s ratings have a higher correlation with the EDP after the 
agency’s entry, then S&P improves its rating responsiveness in response to that entry 
and this type of competition is beneficial.  
Analyze firms that EJR initiated ratings before Fitch did. 
To more directly and accurately compare the net impact of entries of issuer-
paid and investor-paid agencies, future projects can analyze firms that EJR initiated 
coverage before Fitch did. In this manner, researchers can intuitively compare the 
changes in S&P’s rating quality in response to these two types of entries. 
Examine more recent data. 
 Subsequent research should also examine more recent data to evaluate the 
long-run impact of increased competition and other proposed solutions and to assess 
the latest developments in the credit rating industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
REFERENCES 
Beaver, W., Shakespeare, C., & Soliman, M. (2006). Differential properties in the 
ratings of certified versus non-certified bond rating agencies. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics. 42 (3): 303-334. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.06.002 
 
Becker, B., & Milbourn, T. (2011). How did increased competition affect credit 
ratings? Journal of Financial Economics, 101: 493-514.  
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.012  
 
Bolton, P., Freixas, X., & Shapiro, J. (2012). The credit ratings game. Journal of 
Finance, 67 (1): 85-111. 
 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01708.x  
 
Bruno, V., Cornaggia, J., & Cornaggia, K. (2011). The information content of credit 
ratings: Compensation structure does matter. Management Science, 62 (6): 
1578-1597. 
 https://www.egan-
jones.com/public/download/studies/2012_The_Information_Content_of_Credi
t_Ratings_Compensation_Structure_Does_Matter.pdf  
 
Cornaggia, J., Cornaggia, K., & Xia, H. (2015). Revolving doors on Wall Street. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 120 (2): 400-419. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.01.007  
 
Doherty, N., Kartasheva, A., & Phillips, R. (2012). Information effects of entry into 
credit rating market: The case of insurers’ ratings. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 106: 308-330.  
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1101700  
 
Fulghieri, P., Strobl, G., & Xia, H. (2014). The economics of solicited and unsolicited 
credit ratings. The Review of Financial Studies, 27 (2): 484-518. 
 https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hht072 
 
Griffin, J., Nickewsmrson, J., & Tang, D. (2013). Rating shopping or catering? An 
examination of the response to competitive pressure for CDO credit ratings. 
The Review of Financial Studies, 26 (9): 2270-2310. 
 https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hht036 
 
Griffin, J., & Tang, D. (2012). Did subjectivity play a role in CDO credit ratings? The 
Journal of Finance, 67 (4): 1293-1328. 
 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01748.x 
 
Jeon, D., & Lovo, S. (2013). Credit rating industry: A helicopter tour of stylized facts 
and recent theories. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31 (5): 
643-651. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.02.004 
 
 45 
Jiang, J., Stanford, M., & Xie, Y. (2012). Does it matter who pays for bond ratings? 
Historical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 105: 607-621. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.04.001 
 
Jollineau, S. J., Tanlu, L. J., & Winn, A. (2014) Evaluating proposed remedies for 
credit rating agency failures. The Accounting Review, 89 (4): 1399-1420. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-50721  
 
Kisgen, D. (2007). The influence of credit ratings on corporate capital structure 
decision. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 19, 56-64. 
 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2007.00147.x   
 
Kogan, L., & Papanikolaou, D. (2013). Firm characteristics and stock returns: The 
role of investment-specific shocks. The Review of Financial Studies, 26 (11): 
2718-2759. 
 https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hht026  
 
Mathis, J., McAndrews, J., & Rochet, J. (2009). Rating the raters: Are reputation 
concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies? Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 56 (5): 657-674. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2009.04.004 
 
Sangiorgi, F., & Spatt, C. (2012). Opacity, credit rating shopping and bias. 
Management Science, 63 (12): 3999-4446. 
 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2558 
 
Sangiorgi, F., & Spatt, C. (2017). The economics of credit rating agencies. 
Foundations and Trends in Finance, 12: 1-116. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3055889 
 
Skreta, V., & Veldkamp, L. (2009). Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory 
of ratings inflation. Journal of Monetary Economics, 56 (5): 678-695.  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2009.04.006  
 
Strobl, G., & Xia, H. (2012). The issuer-pays rating model and ratings inflation: 
Evidence from corporate credit ratings. SSRN Electronic Journal.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2002186 
 
White, L. (2013). Credit rating agencies: An overview. Annual Review of Financial 
Economics, 5: 93-122. 
 https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110112-120942 
 
Xia, H. (2014). Can investor-paid credit rating agencies improve the information 
quality of issuer-paid rating agencies? Journal of Financial Economics, 111 
(2): 450-468.  
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.015   
 
 
